This paper compares the institutions and goals of the USSR, the EU, and the CIS to understand the differing origins and competing tendencies of these alternative models of transnational governance. It then projects those models through history to examine the current relationships of the former Soviet Republics to the EU and the United States. Understanding the historical sources and development of transnational relations in Eastern Europe will enable better international relations among the EU, the Russian Federation, and the other former Soviet Republics. This comparison will also help the Russian Federation and other former Soviet Republics to take up EU models of governance where appropriate (most often the case) in order to help restructure Eastern Europe, and to safeguard peace by increasing economic prosperity and interdependence.
I. INTRODUCTION
The European Union builds peace through interdependence and prosperity by transferring elements of state sovereignty to intergovernmental and supranational bodies. An unparalleled success, the EU presents a model for transnational governance. The EU is the world's most advanced and successful example of a pragmatic mixture of supra-national and intergovernmental governance. It is thus a key vector of globalization. 2 Other regions of the world, such as Eastern Europe, can emulate its rules and institutions. This paper compares the institutions and objectives of the USSR, the EU, and the CIS to understand the differing origins and competing tendencies of these alternative models of transnational governance. Understanding the systemic differences and commonalities of those models enables the contextualizing of past history, and thus im-proves our understanding of current relationships of the former Soviet Republics to the EU. Hopefully, understanding the historical sources and development of transnational relations in Eastern Europe will, in turn, enable better international relations between the EU, the Russian Federation, and other former Soviet Republics and the United States.
II. COMPARING TELEOLOGIES OF TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE: GOALS AND STRUCTURES
Understanding the past helps us appreciate the present and form the future. First, we compare the goals and structures of the USSR, the EU, and the CIS. By disaggregating the differing origins and competing tendencies of these distinct transnational governance models, we can see their commonalities and the historical breakdowns in order to foster improved relations by understanding shared goals and methods used to attain these goals.
A. The Structure and Teleology of the USSR
The USSR was a one-party system. It was a workers' and peasants' dictatorship in name, 3 directed and led by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). The CPSU regarded itself as a vanguard party, the most advanced elements (intelligentsia) of the most advanced class (the proletariat), subject to democratic centralism (open debate within the party upon the issues, followed by a vote, and then decisive unanimous action to implement the voted decision with no further discussion or dissent), and exercising a dictatorship on behalf of the proletariat (workers and peasants). The party elite of the CPSU (the "nomenklatura") claimed to govern on behalf of and for the benefit of the workers and peasants, i.e. the peoples of the Soviet Union. 4 In western terms, the CPSU was a centralized, hierarchical party of elites directing a centrally planned economy via dictatorship. The dictatorship was justified as necessary to work revolutionary changes on the behalf of the workers and peasants, and, indeed, the initial performance of the USSR was breathtaking. The USSR eradicated illiteracy, literally doubled average life expectancy, 5 and ended the chronic famines endemic of Tsarist Russia. Leninism also instituted sex equality. 6 In these real human terms, Leninism was unquestionably progress as compared to Tsarism. The CPSU justified its dictatorship as the best way to obtain the well-being of the workers and peasants, 7 and also as necessary to help prevent or win any future world war. 8 Over time, however, the Soviet system degenerated, and worked increasingly for the benefit of the party establishment (the "nomenklatura") 9 at the expense of the broad masses of workers and peasants. Meanwhile, the threat of invasion diminished. From this perspective, which I call dual delegitimation, we can better understand the sudden, unexpected, and relatively bloodless restoration of capitalism 10 in Russia. The system, in its own 6 See, e.g., GAIL WARSHOFSKY LAPIDUS, WOMEN IN SOVIET SOCIETY: EQUALITY, DE-VELOPMENT, AND SOCIAL CHANGE 136 (Univ. of Cal. Press 1978). 7 USSR CONSTITUTION, supra note 3 ("The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is a socialist state of the whole people, expressing the will and interests of the workers, peasants, and intelligentsia, the working people of all the nations and nationalities of the country."). 8 Id. art. 28. 9 See generally MICHAEL VOSLENSKY, NOMENKLATURA: THE SOVIET RULING CLASS (Eric Mosbacher trans., Doubleday 1984). 10 Capitalism is a system of economic production predicated on the private ownership of capital. It is distinct from state capitalism wherein the state or publicprivate partnerships hold capital. Many define capitalism as an industrial rather than a feudal mode of production. The Tsarist economy was semi-feudal and industrializing. Further, many of its economic projects involved heavy state participation (state capitalism). However, the ownership of capital in the hands of the financial elite distinguishes Tsarist semi-feudal (state) capitalism from the Soviet planned economy. Of course, strong state participation in the economy, directly and indirectly, remains a mark of the Russian economy. However, the post-Soviet era definitively restored private ownership of capital and the role of the Orthodox terms, lost legitimacy as being no longer necessary for defense against a war that never came. Likewise, the system lost legitimacy because consumer well-being was simply higher in the west and the nightmare of Tsarist famine, illiteracy, and inequality was long past. These systemic facts help explain the near bloodless dissolution of the Soviet system. Soviet foreign policy was less aggressive than what the U.S. foreign policy elites, particularly the military, perceived at the time. Rather than relentlessly seeking to inflame global revolution at every turn in a zero-sum struggle against the West, the USSR first sought to build socialism in one country, 11 and then in its own sphere of influence, to construct a stable autarchic system. The Soviets sought autarchy as the means to self-defense.
Geopolitically, the Soviet system was a series of concentric rings. The USSR was at the center, then Eastern Europe, 12 then Third World Marxist states, and, finally, Third World non-Marxist allies. The closer a country was geographically to the Soviet center, the greater the level of integration into the autarchic economy. Western efforts to "roll back" Marxism were generally unsuccessful, 13 perhaps because the Soviet system was autarchic. The failure of "roll back" ultimately led to the "Brezhnev doctrine," wherein the USSR declared the attainment of "socialism" (i.e. single party state capitalism with worker safeguards) in any country as irreversible. 14 To attain autarchic economic development, the USSR implemented an import substitution industrialization ("ISI") model for economic development. ISI had already been used in the West for the industrialization of the United States and Japan. 15 However, the SoChurch as the spiritual guides of the nation. Thus, I refer to this process as "capitalist restoration" rather than "capitalist instauration". viet system's rationales were the opposite of those of the United States. The USSR justified its version of ISI through rationales of substantive equality and solidarity, and contrasted those with the merely formal freedoms conditioned by economic inequality that justified western democracies 16 some of which were social. Social democracies provide guaranties of basic well being, especially to workers. Socialist production in contrast is the state ownership of enterprises, a form of state capitalism.
Russia's approach to ISI was, within its own terms, rational. The Soviet leadership considered obtaining and maintaining the autarchy of the USSR a necessary, legitimate, and attainable goal.
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Given the historical fact that Russia has suffered invasion after invasion, the Soviet goal of economic autarchy as a means to national security, though definitively economically suboptimal to trade and international economic integration, was politically justifiable, albeit increasingly inapt due to sub-optimal economic performance.
Pursuant to the ISI strategy, the USSR created a ruble currency economic zone, and made the ruble inconvertible.
18 Capital restrictions were the norm as were border controls, such as customs duties and passport checks. The policy of autarchy complemented military security by enabling independent political choices. Soviet leaders saw military security as a precondition to economic security and wellbeing. 19 To circumvent the problem of a lack of foreign currency, the inability to use the ruble for currency exchanges overseas, and related problems arising from the nature of a closed economic system, barter in, and for, real goods was taken up between the COMECON countries. That practice was known as "countertrade" i.e. cashless goodsfor-goods barter. For example, the USSR would barter with Cuba, trading sugar for finished Soviet goods. 20 Barter also occurred at the (describing the exposition of the import substitution industrialization model of development 21 "Gifts" could be justified as "social" and "fraternal" acts under the Marxist logic of transforming monetary economic compulsion into cooperative voluntary social acts. With capitalist restoration, however, the primitive version of a "gift economy" warped into generalized bribery, undermining the rule of law in the post-Soviet era.
22
Preferential tariff treatment for the COMECON and Soviet client states was a key feature of the Socialist bloc's international trade policy. 23 High tariff barriers were created to protect the autarchic COMECON home market. 24 These tariff barriers would also encourage infant industries. 25 Non-tariff technical barriers such as restrictions on imports for health and safety reasons also served the ISI logic. Meanwhile, intellectual property would be either unprotected or weakly protected to use Western innovation to support the USSR.
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For example, piracy of Western computer software and microchip technology was the norm during the Soviet era. 27 Intellectual property law enforcement in Russia relations to this day. 28 Most importantly, the centrally-planned economy's taxing and subsidization systems aimed to accumulate the surplus capital needed for economic development through the creation of infrastructure (e.g., housing, roads, airports) via forced saving 29 and also, ominously, for military production.
The political and legal institutions in the USSR and its satellites paralleled those of the West. Legal and institutional parallels included: the Warsaw Treaty Organization (the Warsaw Pact), which paralleled the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); 30 the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON, also known as CMEA), for its part, paralleled the European Economic Community (EEC). 31 Other parallels could be found fairly readily and, in my opinion, Soviet socialist legalism should be seen as a variant of civilianist law.
Legal and political parallels arose because each system sought the same goals (economic development, technical progress, national security) albeit by somewhat different methods and justified by differing rationales. The Soviet system was an authoritarian egalitarian variant of late modernity that sought to attain economic development using the Western import substitution industrialization (ISI) model.
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The Soviet systemic rationales were substantive equality and social solidarity; the West's were freedom, property and individual rights. These rationales also served as principles for organizing production and social life generally.
The Soviets, like the West, sought the same goals: to obtain a better life for workers (the people) and physical (military) security (i.e., defense). The means to those ends, however, differed. The USSR sought to obtain prosperity not through the capitalist anarchy of production but through centralized economic planning. 33 Similarly, the USSR sought to attain security through autarchy (isolation and independence) rather than through economic interdependence. interdependence was the path to peace the West took, as the EU and WTO exemplify.
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The Soviet economy's key problem was the fact that it was defined around building up a military-industrial complex to fight and win a World War III if ever attacked again: autarchy as a means to security. 36 Tragically, 37 in pursuit of its military defense, the USSR and its Warsaw Pact allies wasted almost all their surplus production on unproductive military spending. 38 Ultimately, the United States response to the failure of rollback and the Brezhnev doctrine was to compete in fields where the USSR could not compete due to technological inferiority or due to the structure of a closed dictatorship. The United States' own arms buildup aimed to bankrupt the USSR by forcing it into an unsustainable arms race, a policy that worked. 39 The resulting economic strains led to constant shortages that seriously undercut the USSR's claim to be creating a workers' paradise with the highest standard of living for ordinary people on earth. 40 The USSR was undermined by economic dislocations, the inability of the planned economy to deliver high quality goods to the most needed areas on time, and due to the increasing strain of militarism. "The party of Lenin," despite such stunning initial success, was ultimately unable to match capital- 35 Id. 36 Id. 37 Recall that tragedy, strictly speaking, means the inevitable downfall of a hero (or anti-hero) due to his excess of virtue. In the Soviet Union "defense of the motherland" taken to its excess became paranoia, crippling production and dooming the system to (inevitable) collapse. However, the West did not win the cold war; rather, the Soviets lost it. 38 40 See, e.g., 31 V. I. LENIN, COLLECTED WORKS 516 (1966) (stating "Communism is Soviet power plus the electrification of the whole country." That is, the Soviet system justified itself as the fastest route to development, which it was for at least one generation. However, ultimately, the system lost legitimacy as it became clear and clearer that the west produced better quality consumer goods and in greater numbers).
ism in the quality and abundance of consumer goods. 41 This, coupled with the increasing tendency of the nomenklatura to serve its own goals rather than to seek the well-being of all the Soviet peoples, and the fact that the U.S., unlike Nazi Germany, was not threatening to invade the USSR to seize resources, led to a crisis of purpose, of legitimacy, and a capitalist restoration.
B. The Objectives of the EU
The EU aims to form a single, integrated European market to: (1) break the link between territory and trade which drove Europe into at least two global wars; and (2) generate the prosperity through trade that results from specialization in production, economies of scale, and reduced transaction costs. 42 At one extreme, Euro-Federalists have cautiously and tentatively argued for the formation of a "United States of Europe." 43 The Euro-Federalists' ultimate goal is both unrealistic and undesirable -recreating mercantilist nation states as mercantilist continental empires would only lead to more global conflict. 44 Good, practical reasons, however, validated the EU's creation. The EU's objectives, also (and more importantly) included preventing another European war and improving the well-being of all workers. 45 Those objectives were attained through the functionalist method of forming specialized institutions defined around particular goals to take advantage of unbiased expert judgment. This expert judgment in specific sectors in turn enabled the EU to attain socially desirable goals in the common interest of all Europeans in an incremental stepby-step fashion. 47 European states also formed a customs union, the European Economic Community (EEC) to disaggregate national cartels, which were seen as a cause of wars for market share, because trade and territory had been linked and as a result the only way any state could expand its economy and resource base was by war. 48 Thus, the customs union aimed to attain a single integrated market via the free movement of goods, workers, capital, and enterprises (the four freedoms). Ultimately, the EU evolved into a supranational body with a common currency (the Euro), common citizenship and passports, common borders (the Schengen Area), and to some extent, a common foreign and security policy. 49 As a confederation, 50 the EU began to share many elements of classical Westphalian nationstates.
51

C. The Objectives of the CIS
The CIS arose in the chaotic aftermath of the collapse of the USSR, which saw competing concerns hamper political movements toward cooperative relations in the former Soviet states. 52 53 Even presupposing the unity of Russian nationalist leaders, the fact that such unity centered on "great Russian nationalism" rather than "proletarian internationalism" indicates that the CIS's centralizing tendencies were disunited and unattractive to the newly independent national states. On the part of the CIS leaders, this indicates disunity of factions and of objectives. Nevertheless, even if there were a unity, if only of great Russian factions and objectives, then that unitary vision was not able to attract adhesion or persuade the newly independent national republics in, e.g. former Soviet Central Asia, to help form some variant of confederation featuring a customs union and/or common currency and/or common defense.
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The lack of a compelling and attractive central vision of shared goals and objectives for the CIS crippled it as an institution for transnational governance. Absent a common teleology or purpose, the CIS protection of domestic industries has increased. Import tariffs on "sensitive imports", such as refined sugar, have started to pop up. By far the most serious barriers to trade and the ones most frequently used are non-tariff barriers. The ever more complex and constantly changing trade regimes of many CIS countries have also opened the door for corruption and smuggling."). 53 degenerated into the political overseer of the peaceful dissolution of the USSR 55 and, to a limited extent, the introduction of market mechanisms to replace the planned economic system. Consequently, in Western literature the CIS is typically described as "moribund" and can accurately be compared to the present day British Commonwealth. 56
The Breakdown of the CIS
The CIS failed to evolve into a viable transnational governing institution due to a lack of a common vision 57 and elite inexperience in transnational institutionalism, 58 particularly with regards to market liberalization. 59 The CIS sought to undertake the simultaneous tasks of privatization, political and economic liberalization, and the implementation of the rule of law to replace rule-by-command. However, the CIS lacked experts and practical proficiency in transnational governance beyond the context of a strong vertical hierarchy of a oneparty dictatorship. Consequently, liberal western transnational governance models such as those of the European Communities could not inform the CIS's already overwhelmed managerial class. Moreover, some of the new managerial class were Soviet era "economic 55 See Roberts & Wehrheim, supra note 52, at 323 ("Ten years after the break up of the USSR, CIS countries are still struggling to find the appropriate format to govern their mutual trade relations. At present a patchwork of half-implemented bilateral agreements and a series of paper framework agreements govern intra-CIS trade relations. Most of the RTAs among CIS member states remain de jure agreements. If one were to characterise this institutional framework, one might term it 'managed disintegration'."). 56 , available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1440809 ("The CIS was burdened with ambivalent goals. On the one hand, it aimed to assist the newly independent countries to gain economic independence, while on the other hand it was the intended institution to bring the newly independent states together in an economic union. The ambivalent character of the CIS, and the increasing self-consciousness, both politically and economically, of the newly independent states, resulted in numerous bilateral and multilateral agreements at the same time."). 58 criminals," 60 while others were former nomenklatura. Consequently, factionalism soon ensued both between and within these two historically conflicting groups. The CIS's failure is unsurprising, and was perhaps even inevitable, given those conditions. 61 Lacking a common vision, the CIS defaulted into the role of the clearinghouse for the USSR's remarkably peaceful dissolution via two distinct factors: (i) privatization; and (ii) the devolution of former federal powers to individual Republics.
62
The institutional problems mentioned contributed to the breakdown of CIS. For example, the CIS's transnational trade policy was characterized by incoherence. Numerous overlapping multilateral and bilateral treaties covered similar issues, 63 leading to economic disputes due to the contradictory obligations imposed by the various treaties. 64 However, these overlapping multilateral and bilateral treaties also left many issues unaddressed. 65 For example, the CIS' agreements were not sophisticated enough to take into account non-tariff 60 63 "What can be observed in the CIS is that economic cooperation takes the form of overlapping bilateral and multilateral agreements of very distinct legal quality. From an economic point of view it does not make sense that countries that have concluded a multilateral free trade agreement, as the CIS countries did in 1994, an agreement that they amended in 1999, subsequently conclude bilateral free trade agreements with their partners as well. It creates overlap, increases transaction costs, and obfuscates the status of multilateral and bilateral agreements." See Dragneva & de Kort, supra note 57, at 1. 64 Id. ("What can be observed in the CIS is that economic cooperation takes the form of overlapping bilateral and multilateral agreements of very distinct legal quality. From an economic point of view it does not make sense that countries that have concluded a multilateral free trade agreement, as the CIS countries did in 1994, an agreement that they amended in 1999, subsequently conclude bilateral free trade agreements with their partners as well. It creates overlap, increases transaction costs, and obfuscates the status of multilateral and bilateral agreements."). 65 See id. ("The agreements that are concluded often are partial and selective, while their ratification and implementation also is a mixed affair.").
trade barriers such as health, safety, and technical restrictions to trade. 66 In sum, CIS institutions and rules were simply ineffective. Any effort to bring the USSR's customs and monetary union into the CIS era was thus doomed for several interlocking reasons. The absence of legal concepts important to coordinating supranational and intergovernmental tendencies and attaining by accretion the objectives of economic integration-such as "basic economic rights" (the four freedoms) 67 subsidiarity, proportionality, and acquired community positions (acquis communautaire 68 )-within the CIS treaties further crippled the CIS. Common institutions such as the Economic Court of the CIS were weak or entirely absent 69 because of a lack of a common will, common goals, and common concepts.
Although the CIS lacked the institutional expertise and juridical structure to transform the USSR into something like the EEC, this does not mean that it is currently impossible or undesirable. Accordingly, this paper considers the Eurasian Economic Community 66 See id. at 3 ("The CIS trade regime can be described as a symbiosis between bilateral and multilateral regimes, both of which can be described as weak regimes. Bilateral agreements cover some key free trade rules, such as tariffs, but remain minimal and quite basic. Non-tariff barriers, for instance, are generally left out, as are liberalisation of services or intellectual property to name a few issues that have become important in international trade agreements. Disputes are generally resolved through consultations"). 67 The central concept to the foundation of the European Union as an economic area are the four freedoms (basic rights): the free movement of goods, workers, capital and of enterprises among the Member States. See, e.g., Engle he CIS presents a mix of, often overlapping, bilateral and multilateral agreements. The picture gets even more complicated as bilateral and multilateral agreements often differ in the strength of commitment they require from the signatories. Bilateral agreements rarely envision a mechanism for resolving disputes between its parties, relying on negotiations to do so. Multilateral agreements on the other hand often do attempt to strengthen the bindingness of the commitments undertaken. In 1993, the Treaty of the Economic Union even went as far as to strengthen the role of the Economic Court, by requiring that 'if the Economic Court recognises that [. . .] a member state has not fulfilled its obligation ensuing from the Treaty, this state is obliged to take measures connected with the implementation of the decision of the Economic Court'. A year later, in 1994, a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) was concluded which 'undermines' the position of the Economic Court. . .").
(EurAsEC) to see whether and how the CIS may consider and implement EU principles.
The Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC)
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Following the instauration of market mechanisms to replace the planned economic system, and because of the EU's continual success as an institution of transnational governance, the Russian Federation, Belarus, and Kazakhstan together instituted a customs union known as the "Eurasian Economic Community." 71 The EurAsEC could, and should, look directly to the EU's growth and evolution as a source of inspiration and also for basic legal concepts such as:
Direct effect of treaty provisions (that private persons have directly enforceable rights and duties under the EurAsEC treaty).
The four freedoms (free movement of goods, labor capital, workers and enterprises) 72 Acquis communautaire (the idea that each step toward a single integrated market is irreversible, and that new adherents to the EurAsEC must agree to abide by the existing acquis) 73 
"General principles of international law" as a source of EurAsEC law
The principle of legality (that EurAsEC institutions should be legal, not political) Functionalism (that the EurAsEC institutions should be built out incrementally to progressively attain a single integrated market)
Economic development occurs more quickly through open borders. 74 Thus, despite critiques of the rule of law and democracy in the former Soviet republics, the path forward is through free trade. Eco- 70 About EurAsEC, EBPAÇÈÉCKOEÝKOHOMÈ?ECKOE COOÁÙECTBO (Aug. 24, 2011), http://www.evrazes.com/en/about ("[A] customs union within the EurAsEC framework, with the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation as initial members. Other EurAsEC member states will join the customs union when their economies are ready to take this step."). 71 Roberts & Wehrheim, supra note 52, at 321 ("Russia and two other CIS countries -Kazakhstan and Belarus -established a customs union (CU) in 1995. The Kyrgyz Republic joined in March 1996 and Tajikistan in 1999. The text of the customs provided for discontinuation of all trade tariffs between member countries, tariffs for trade with other countries were adjusted to one level, [i.e., harmonized into a common external tariff] and the system of privileges was unified. In addition, certain measures were taken to unify tax policy (tax rates and application of indirect taxes). The agreements on the customs union called for coordination of customs, excise, and value-added dues."). 72 See, e.g., Engle, Europe Deciphered, supra note 2, at 75. 73 nomic development is the most practical and effective way to build stronger and more democratic institutions in the former Soviet Republics because wealth creates the conditions that enable genuine human rights protection. 75 The authoritarian democracies in the former Soviet Republics are not systematic violators of the most basic human rights.
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Functionalist incrementalism is thus more effective than extreme methods at securing human rights protection.
77 Economic integration resulting from freer trade and improved economic performance are positively correlated. 78 Likewise, improved economic performance and improved human rights protection are positively correlated. 79 Consequently, through a constructive engagement policy, 80 trade can help improve economic well-being, leading to both improved human rights protection, and improved rule of law within the former Soviet Republics.
Supranational and intergovernmental governance worked well in the EU to leverage Member States and their immediate neighbors out of war. 81 The former Soviet Republics can and should use those same methods -economic integration leading to increased prosperity to foster peace and the progressive realization of human rights 82 -to support the rule of law and human rights protection. 83 Free trade generates economic prosperity, which in turn generates improved human rights protection. 84 Thus, free trade improves human rights protection.
Comparing CIS and EU institutions
Marx demonstrated that the business cycle of booms, panics, and depressions causes wars to obtain markets and raw materials as well as to burn off surplus production and employ the unemployed. Both the EU 86 and the USSR sought to prevent such wars and to attain well-being for ordinary workers. However, their similar teleological goals were to be attained by differing means. Institutionally, the USSR was, at least nominally, a workers' and peasants' dictatorship: an advanced vanguard party would exercise a dictatorship on behalf of the proletariat 87 to prevent 88 the wars for market share that capitalism unleashed in economic crises at the trough of business cycles.
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While we might criticize the idea of a vanguard party exercising a dictatorship on behalf of workers and peasants, we should also understand that the USSR's proletarian dictatorship shared the same stated objectives as the EU. Paradoxally, the EU and USSR both sought to transform the state (coercion) into society (voluntarism), but through opposite means. The USSR, following Marx's prescription to transform the state into civil society, 90 sought to end market relations entirely 91 to attain the goal of peace and prosperity. The EU sought to use market forces to attain that same goal.
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Like the EU, the USSR was multinational, multilingual, and attained a monetary union with the free movement of goods, labor, and capital. But, the USSR did not in fact attain the best standard of living for workers. Life expectancy was only a few years lower than in 86 91 See, e.g., USSR CONSTITUTION, supra note 3, at art. 4 ("The socialist system of economy and the socialist ownership of the means and instruments of production firmly established as a result of the abolition of the capitalist system of economy, the abrogation of private ownership of the means and instruments of production and the abolition of the exploitation of man by man, constitute' the economic foundation of the U.S.S.R. 1936."). 92 See, e.g., Treaty of Rome, supra note 45, at pmbl.
the West but double that of Tsarist Russia.
93 Leisure was assured, but consumer goods were always in short supply. 94 The quality of goods suffered from production deadlines at the end of the five-year planning cycles when production goals had to be met, though this improved over time. 95 However, in sum, the quality of Soviet life did not match Western European standards. This was mostly because so much of the government's resources were wasted on building a military-industrial complex that did not advance the well-being of Soviet citizens. 96 Moreover, the planned economy faced an increasingly complex task: the centralized coordination of production and distribution of a growing variety of goods.
97 Central planning of a primitive industrializing economy with only a few basic inputs is considerably easier than for a diversified industrial economy with hundreds of consumer goods. The Soviet planned economy succeeded in shifting the USSR from a semi-feudal economy producing but a score of basic goods into an industrial economy. 98 This newly created industrial economy, however, produced a myriad of different goods. 99 This production diversity doomed the centrally planned economy. Namely, the ever-greater product variety made central planning increasingly complex and thus less efficient when coordinating production and consumption. Soviet production was not, however, entirely inefficient. Soviet weaponry was cheap, durable, easily maintained and reliable. The USSR was the first country to put a satellite into space, and later a man into orbit. Still, the USSR's centrally planned economic production system was more appropriate for a semi-feudal industrializing society with few goods than for a highly developed industrial economy producing a myriad of goods.
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The institution of a single party dictatorship and the teleology of the USSR were not apt to liberalism. 101 102 The establishment of inter CIS customs and tariff barriers raised transaction costs and reduced economies of scale.
103 Restructuring a centrally planned dictatorial economy centered on autarchy and war into a consumer oriented networked globalizing economy exacerbated those problems. The result was sub-optimal economic performance. 104 At times, the newly independent Republics were trying to implement outdated and inefficient liberal or Soviet models of economic development. At other times, they became disposable experiments in neoliberalism. All too often the results were chaos, corruption, asset stripping, and economic failure 105 resulting in a declining average life expectancy in the post-Soviet years.
106 These results explain why multiparty liberal democracy did not take root in some of the former Soviet Republics. The return of one-party rule in some former Soviet Republics after the collapse of the USSR resulted from the chaos of the failed Soviet planned economy model, the failed ISI model, and the asset stripping and kleptocracy which resulted from neoliberal experimentation. The CIS's lack of institutional experience and personnel expertise in the principles and practices of liberal markets and transnational governance in any context other than that of a single party dictatorship in turn explains the failure of the CIS member states to have adopted EU governance models in the late 1990s.
III. CONCEPTS IN TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE
This section describes the relationships between the rule of law, the economy, human rights protection, and democracy. It outlines ideas about political legitimation and presents practical methods to advance transnational relations to explain how international relations between the United States, the E.U., and the former Soviet Republics may be improved.
A. Historical Materialism Revisited
A key question for transnational governance is: how to untangle the relationships among the rule of law, democracy, the economic system, and human rights? The rule of law, democracy, free trade, and human rights protection are all positively associated -improving the protection of one tends to improve protection of the others.
107 Does any hierarchy order their relations?
I hypothesize that the rule of law is needed for an optimally productive market economy, and that a productive economy and the rule of law in turn lead to effective human rights protection de jure and de facto respectively. I also argue that democratic institutions are less important to human rights protection or to the attainment of the rule of law than is usually thought to be the case. 108 That is because, in practice, democratic processes are used only to reinforce and legitimize policies which were already formed by elites rather than to actually create public policies. 109 Most legislative bills are introduced not by democratic referenda but by elected republican representatives. 107 Policies are typically proposed by elites 110 which are then either taken up or rejected by masses through the democratic process.
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The West tends to equate democracy with the rule of law, 112 and wrongly presumes that the democratic process is necessary to the rule of law and human rights protection. I maintain that the rule of law leads to a productive economy. 113 The rule of law and a productive economy together foster democratic processes and provide substantive human rights protection. These ideas are summed up in the following "key points":
The rule of law is necessary for a productive open market;
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A market economy with social protections favors prosperity; Economic prosperity favors protection of human rights; Democratic deficit can be ex post facto legitimized by the success of public policies that were politically unpopular at the time of their enactment. 110 
See CHARLES WRIGHT MILLS & ALAN WOLFE, THE POWER ELITE 3-4 (2000)
. 111 Anne Peters argues, as does this paper, for "legitimation ex post" i. Rather than adopting the position that democratic processes are either the source of human rights protection or a necessary precondition to the rule of law, I argue that the rule of law and economic development positively correlate 115 and that each is a precondition to effective and meaningful human rights defense. I also argue that democratic legitimation can be an outcome of economic and legal development.
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These arguments reiterate the historical materialist claims that economic processes ultimately drive legal and ideological rationalizations of any given political system. 117 The dialectical materialist refinement of that argument is to note that the economic base (the forces of production) generally determines the legal forms of the superstructure (the relations of production), but that exceptionally, at particular times and under certain conditions, the superstructure (ideology) can determine the base (production). 118 In other words, the material forces of production generally constitute and constrain the ideological superstructure that rationalizes them -but, exceptionally, at certain times and places in history, the ideological superstructure can influence and compel the structure of the material forces of production.
Marxism aimed to act as a catalyst for the natural and inevitable movement of history by intervening "at the margins," -these excep- Perhaps the vanguard party's altruism outran the basic needs for consumption of the productive base (the workers) it was leading. Perhaps the vanguard party became corrupted. Perhaps both explanations apply. Nevertheless, the USSR shows that vanguard parties exercising a dictatorship on behalf of the proletariat are very effective at ending illiteracy and starvation, and at introducing sex equality, but are not terribly effective at coordinating production and consumption in a complex consumer economy. 120 The rule of law, economic development via free trade and open markets, human rights protection, and democracy all correlate positively and are mutually reinforcing. 121 These concepts form an interrelated hierarchy. I postulate their priority as follows. Without basic laws, economic development is impossible due to physical insecurity and legal uncertainty. Without economic development, human rights protection is impossible or at least meaningless. Meanwhile, democratic processes require a basic legal system and at least minimal economic well-being. Human rights protections without economic development are sub-optimal. For example, religious freedom in the face of starvation is merely the right to receive one's last rites, so to speak. While dying with dignity isn't utterly meaningless, would it not be better to choose life, somehow? By placing survival rights, such as the right to food, 122 ahead of psychological rights, or even political rights, we will better protect people in real terms.
In any case, democracy, productive open markets, human rights protection, and the rule of law are all positively correlated, and mutually reinforcing. As Russia increasingly implements the rule of law, transaction costs will decline, which will strengthen the economy. This, in turn, creates an environment where it is possible to envision better human rights protections and practically apply the material re- POLICY 14-15 (1992) ("Functionalism is a theory of international organization which holds that a world community can best be achieved not by attempts at the immediate political union of states, but by the creation of non-political international agencies dealing with specific economic, social, technical, or humanitarian functions. Functionalists assume that economic, social and technical problems can be separated from political problems and insulated from political pressures."). 126 Juliet Lodge, Preface: The Challenge of the Future, in THE EUROPEAN COMMU-NITY AND THE CHALLENGE OF THE FUTURE, at xix (Juliet Lodge ed., 2d ed. 1993) ("The logic behind the approach is to prevent war not negatively -by keeping states apart -but positively by engaging them in cooperative ventures . . . to establish functionally specific agencies, initially in what were then seen as non-contentious areas like welfare. These were to transcend national boundaries and be managed by rational technocrats (not swung by the vagaries of political ideology and power-hungry political parties) owing their allegiance to a functionally specific organization not to a given nation state . . . Their tasks will cover those areas of the economy essential to running military machines. Governments, deprived of control over those areas, will be unable to pursue war and will eventually be left to manage residual areas not covered by functional bodies . . ."). 127 Sabino Cassese, European Administrative Proceedings, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 21, 23 (2004) ("functionalism . . . has enabled the incremental, progressive development of the European Union"). 128 Lodge, supra note 126 ("Functionalism starts from the premise that by promoting functional cooperation among states it may be possible to deter them from settling disputes over competition for scarce resources aggressively.").
ing trade and territory. 129 One tenet of functionalism is that economic and political integration is best achieved not at one fell swoop with grandiose and impossible ideas, 130 but rather through incremental efforts in diverse fields. 131 Functionalism is realistic and pragmatic: it seeks to attain the possible here and now rather than utopian dreams that never really come true. Its methods obtain political legitimacy after the fact because of the success of the institution at achieving practical goals. 132 Ultimately, functionalists aim to prevent war not by keeping states apart, but by drawing them together -by establishing transparent, responsible, and effective transnational governance structures in specific sectors. Neo-functionalism takes functionalism one step forward by seeking political integration. 133 Just as functionalist methods were successfully applied to create the EEC and grow them into the EU, so can they be used to build stable prosperous transnational governance among the former Soviet Republics, and foster the rule of law and human rights protection through increased economic prosperity. 134 Specifically, the functionalist method would focus on developing the idea of the rule of law in Eastern Europe. First is the idea of an impartial independent judici- (2000)). 133 Lodge, supra note 126 ("Neofunctionalists have a common starting point with functionalists in their attachment to . . . learning processes, allegedly apolitical, technocratic socio-economic welfare functions, consensus-building and functional specificity, neofunctionalists adopt a pluralist perspective. They argue that competitive economic and political elites mediate in the process and not only become involved in it but become key players. . . . Neofunctional integration sees integration as a process based on spillover from one initially non-controversial, technical sector to other sectors of possibly greater political salience, involving a gradual reduction in the power of national government and a commensurate increase in the ability of the centre to deal with sensitive, politically charged issues."). 134 ary seeking to implement the national will as expressed in legislation. Second is the idea of law as more than mere positive command, but law also as persuasive attractive, and moral appeal. Third is the idea of legal certainty. This requires further construction of a but partially existent legal culture. In Estonia, for example, Soviet era judges were effectively shunted aside to secondary tasks, retrained, and entered retirement or academia. New judges were selected from shockingly young candidates. To a much lesser extent this is also happening in Russia. The lack of institutional retraining initiatives extending from the United States or E.U., however, can be partly to blame. Educating and reforming an entire legal culture is necessary, but initiatives to do so are starkly lacking. With the formation of a neutral independent unbiased judiciary it would then be possible to form transparent, responsible and effective institutions. A functionalist approach would then seek to protect human rights sequentially, focusing first on survival rights, then on economic rights, progressively attaining ever greater human rights protections: the hierarchy of norms 135 to attain the hierarchy of needs.
136 I have argued elsewhere for hierarchizing some of the basic human rights as follows: the right to one's own life, then the right to food, 137 then the right to shelter, then political rights and cultural rights. 138 In other words, one's basic needs in the hierarchy must be met before the more advanced and complex needs can be satisfied.
139 All these rights are vital to a good life, but some naturally precede others.
From the Russian perspective, establishing a judiciary or administrative institution is easy: The President and Prime Minister issue the order. But the question is, how can Russia form an 135 Dec. 10, 1948 ), available at http://www.un.org/en/documents/ udhr/ ("Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control."). 138 independent and unbiased judiciary? From the EU perspective, forming judicial expertise is not difficult. It is a matter of training in western legal methods. Joint E.U.-Russian judicial and administrative bodies might enable the positive implementation of neutral unbiased adjudication. EU judges would also thereby be able to compare experiences, methods, and ideas with their Russian counterparts. This is to merely indicate the extent of the problem and suggest possible ways ahead.
C. Ex Post Legitimacy and Democratic Deficit in the EU
Democratic deficit in the EU was not an obstacle to economic and political integration because of legitimation after the fact. As long as processes are transparent (i.e. open, governed by the rule of law) and not tainted with secrecy and deception (i.e. political), policies can attain legitimacy after their implementation by virtue of their efficacy.
The EU was a long term project driven by elites with minimal mass support. 140 It was built gradually and sequentially, using the functionalist method that focused first on aggregating the war industries, and then on dissolving national cartels by building a single integrated market for goods, labor, capital, and services. The war industries were made subject to common control not to prepare for a war against the Soviet bloc, but to prevent yet another Western European War. While NATO greatly facilitated the EU's development by providing a defensive umbrella under the premise of collective security, two World Wars had already shown that collective security alone is insufficient to prevent war. Something beyond nation-state alliances are necessary to achieve lasting peace. That something is economic integration.
The EU was built without the mass public support often thought needed for political legitimization. Despite this democratic deficit, the EU has emerged to become one of the world's most competent and effective transnational organizations. One lesson of the EU for the former Soviet Republics is that the former Soviet Republics problem of democratic governance is surmountable. We can and should draw all the lessons from the EU's experiences. Democratic institutions in Eastern Europe can be built gradually over time using functionalist methods. Transnational governance via functionalism will generate the economic well-being necessary to create a foundation for improved respect of human rights. We now turn our attention to the relationship between the EU and Eastern Europe. This will help us understand exactly how Eastern Europe can apply EU governance models to build effective, transparent participatory state systems governed by the rule of law, and thus enjoy economic prosperity and improved human rights protections.
IV. THE EU AND RUSSIA "We propose the creation of a harmonious economic community stretching from Lisbon to Vladivostok" -Vladimir Putin 141 The success of the EU as an example of transnational governance and the growing number of Eastern European legal scholars familiar with the basics of EU law explain the growing acceptance of the EU in the former Soviet republics. The Russian Federation's ultimate long-term goal with the EU is to form an economic union to achieve trading synergies and encourage technological innovation 142 to generate economic development. Schumpeter rightly noted that innovation generates wealth. 143 EurAsEc and the EU complement each other 144 because each has the same goals: to attain economic development via free trade and to engage in economic integration to create the economic base needed for human rights protection, to guarantee the rule of law, and to obviate the risk of war. EurAsEc could develop independently of the EU, but he logic of economic synergy resulting from specialization and economies of scale enjoyed as a result of free trade, however, explains why both transnational organizations are more effective when cooperating rather than when competing with each other. These economic benefits are further augmented by the fact that good foreign relations means fewer resources wasted on weapons. France's Nicholas Sarkozy supports Russia's desire for economic integration with Europe, as does Italy's Silvio Berlusconi. 145 As earlier noted, the desire for increased economic integration is partly driven by the fact that trade between Russia and Europe is growing. (2010) , available at http://www.erneuerbare-energien.de/files/english/pdf/application/pdf/broschuere_ ee_zahlen_en_bf.pdf ("The expansion of renewable energy sources in Germany has been an exemplary success. Since 2000, renewable energies' contribution to final energy supply has increased 2.5-fold to a level of 10.3 %. In the electricity sector, the German Government had originally aimed to achieve a 12.5 % renewables' share of gross electricity demand by 2010. This target was already surpassed, considerably, by 2007. In 2009, a share of over 16% had been reached."). 148 Eben Harrell, Germany Decides to Extend Nuclear Power, TIME (Sept. 6, 2010, 7:38 AM), http://ecocentric.blogs.time.com/2010/09/06/germany-decides-to-extendnuclear-power/ ("Every [sic] since Chernobyl puffed its radioactive plume over Europe in 1986, Germany has been deeply suspicious of nuclear power. Opposition to Atomkraft is at the center of the country's green movement, and almost a decade ago the country decided to phase out its nuclear plants by 2021.").
will pay the most. 152 Recall that, during the Cold War, the USSR did not participate in the Arab oil embargos and continued to sell petroleum to the U.S. 153 This experience demonstrates that energy issues are not determinative of foreign relations between the Russian Federation and other states, but merely constrain outcomes because of the fact that energy dependence is relative, not absolute. While the importance of those economic relationships is obvious, they are not the EU's primary legal concern. Nor are these economic relationships the driving force of efforts toward Russia's de jure economic integration into the EU or the WTO. Meanwhile, de facto economic integration is, and will continue to further deepen regardless of political issues because of practical economic facts.
Mutual economic interests between the EU and Russia are leading to de facto economic integration. Europe is dependent on Russian primary resources and exchanges them for investments into Russia's secondary and tertiary markets. 154 This creates conditions under which the rule of law is likely to be increasingly respected because 1) Increasing wealth makes rule breaking less frequent due to reduced desperation; 2) Foreign investors do not wish to see their economic interests nationalized and foster the rule of law through private contractual mechanisms such as jurisdiction and binding arbitration clauses; and 3) International commerce requires legal stability so that contracts clear quickly and efficiently, thus incentivizing the Russian judiciary to professionalism. This extensive wealth creation in turn indirectly makes the real protection of human rights much likelier in practice. I argue that de jure economic integration will accelerate the inevitable process of de facto economic integration and help contribute to the formation of the rule of law in the former Soviet Republics, at least in an exemplary fashion, though hopefully also through formation of institutions and comparison of expertise.
What about human rights? Often people think of the false dichotomy: "either the market or human rights." In fact, trade leads to prosperity resulting in better human rights protection. 155 Trade also leads to interdependence, making war unprofitable. Accordingly, the EU seeks to create an open integrated market with the Russian Federation. Both partners desire increased integration because the EU is Russia's main trading partner 156 and because the level of trade between the EU and Russia continues to rapidly grow.
Political Concerns
Politically, the EU's concerns with respect to the Russian Federation go to questions of the rule of law, democracy, 158 and human rights protection.
159
As to the rule of law, a Russian procedural rule of law state enables construction of durable and predictable legal institutions, rather than uncertain political ones, with the aim of transforming zero-sum political interactions into positive-sum economic interactions. Corruption in the domestic governance of the Russian Federation is a substantive problem for Russia's relationship with the EU because it threatens the security of economic relations 160 and undermines protection of human rights.
The EU's desire to foster democracy, in turn, is not merely an issue of the legitimacy of state power. The existence of democratic institutions is also taken -to some extent erroneously -as evidence or guarantor of the rule of law. 161 The EU's concern with democracy in 163 However, equating democracy and the rule of lawand they do correlate -means that failure to attain the former is seen, wrongly, as necessarily, i.e. inevitably, impinging on attainment of the latter, and this can prevent progress. The rule of law is a precondition to stable business relations, in turn generating prosperity 164 and leads to effective human rights protection. 165 Democratic legitimation can thus be obtained after the fact and is not a necessary, indispensable precondition to improving human well-being in real terms.
lenges by means of a balanced, results-oriented approach based on democracy and the rule of law."). 162 See, e.g., Maria Elena Efthymiou, Fact Sheets on the European Union: Russian Federation, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (Jan. 25, 2011), http://www.europarl.europa. eu/parliament/expert/displayFtu.do?language=EN&id=73&ftuId=FTU_6.4.2.html ("The fundamental values and principles of democracy, human rights, the rule of law and the market economy underpin the EU-Russia bilateral relationship and its legal basis, the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA). Russia and the EU are committed to work together to combat new threats to international security, such as terrorism, organised crime, illegal migration and trafficking in people as well as drugs."). 163 See, e.g., EU/Russia Summit, supra note 144, at para. F ("whereas, as a member of the Council of Europe and of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Russia has committed itself to protect and promote human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law, and to respect the sovereignty of its European neighbours; whereas EU-Russia relations have faced a number of serious challenges over the last few years, notably as regards concerns about democracy and human rights in Russia"). Open governance institutions and processes are needed for the economy;
166 the rule of law is also crucial for human rights protection. 167 Poverty resulting from legal uncertainty and corruption reduces the real level of human rights protection and the legitimacy of Russian democracy. 168 The relationships between the rule of law, a productive economy (which results from an open market, free trade, and the rule of law), democracy, and the attainment of human rights are mutually reinforcing and intertwined in complex ways They are, however, all positively associated: improvement in one tends to encourage improvement in the others.
Economic Concerns
As mentioned earlier, the economic context of Russian-EU trade can be summed up as "raw materials for finished goods," a normal pattern of trade between developed and developing countries. 169 In other words, the EU and the Russian Federation have an economic relationship based on interdependence. Nevertheless, Russian-EU 166 See Sergei Guriev, Tackling Corruption in the Russian Economy, OPENDEMOCRACY.NET (Nov. 12, 2009), http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/ sergei-guriev/tackling-corruption-in-russian-economy ("Growth requires specific economic institutions: the protection of ownership rights and of competition, the fulfillment of contracts (i.e. an independent and effective court system."). 167 (Spring 2002) , available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3996/ is_200204/ai_n9062371/ ("declining state capacity, fiscal austerity, and growing social inequality, characteristic features of many of the new democracies, translate into gross violations of the rights of socially vulnerable groups."). 169 See EU-Russia Energy Relations, EUROPEAN COMM'N (Sept. 13, 2011), http:// ec.europa.eu/energy/international/russia/russia_ en.htm ("The Russian Federation is the 3rd biggest world trade partner of the EU. Energy represents 65% of total EU imports from Russia. Russia is the biggest oil, gas, uranium and coal exporter to the EU. In 2007, 44.5% of total EU's gas imports (150bcm), 33.05% of total EU's crude oil imports, and 26% of total EU coal imports came from Russia. In total, around 24% of total EU gas sources are originating from Russia. In general, energy dependency varies significantly between different Member States / regions in the EU. The EU is by far the largest trade partner of the Russian Federation: 45% of Russia imports originate from the EU, and 55% of its exports go to the EU, including 88% of Russia's total oil exports, 70% of its gas exports and 50% of its coal exports. The export of raw materials to the EU represents around 40% of the Russian budget, and the EU represents 80% of cumulative foreign investments in Russia.").
trade has not, to present, coalesced into a binding legal document or relationship 170 beyond the existing partnership and cooperation agreement.
The key to peace and prosperity in the war 21st century is economic interdependence rather than isolation. Trading states have a strong incentive to renounce war against each other.
171 For example, the United States, unlike the EU, does not trade heavily with the Russian Federation. 172 Perhaps as a consequence, U.S. analysts seem to overemphasize security aspects of the West's relationship with Russia. 
Legal Concerns
The EU's legal concerns with Russia touch a myriad of issues. This section covers only some of the most salient ones. One concern is criminality, 174 which includes arms and drug trafficking. 175 Human migration is also a concern, with fears that Russian workers might flood European labor markets.
176
These fears, however, are not particularly realistic. Most people are not criminals, and most criminals are eventually caught. The EU's eastward expansion did not lead to the flooding of Western European labor markets with cheap Eastern labor. 177 Western European fears of a flood of Eastern European workers have shown themselves to be unrealistic and overstated.
178 Like most modern industrialized countries, the Russian Federation faces net labor inflows rather than outflows. 179 In fact, about ten million foreigners, mostly from China and Northern Korea, work in the Rus- 174 See Matthew Day, EU Immigration Fears over Polish Visa Deal with Russia, THE INDEPENDENT.IE (Dec. 28, 2010), http://www.independent.ie/world-news/europe/eu-immigration-fears-over-polish-visa-deal-with-russia-2475682.html ("Poland is pushing for citizens of the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad to have visa-free travel, despite fears this could increase smuggling and illegal migration into the European Union."). 175 Cf. Freedom, Security and Justice, supra note 158 ("Our cooperation contributes to the objective of building a new Europe without dividing lines and facilitating travel between all Europeans while creating conditions for effectively fighting illegal migration. Moreover, the EU has a considerable interest in strengthening cooperation with Russia by jointly addressing common challenges such as organised crime, terrorism and other illegal activities of cross-border nature."). 176 Russia-EU summit: Is Russia Part of Europe?, RIANOVOSTI (June 2, 2010, 5:04 PM), http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20100602/159271440.html ("The visa barrier between the EU and its eastern neighbors has been growing stronger since the 1990s as a result of Europe's fear of a wave of poor immigrants from the East. As it turns out, this fear was unjustified. Even after Poland joined the EU and all restrictions on Polish immigration were lifted, Poles continued to immigrate to other European countries legally for jobs they had already secured and with enough travel money in their pockets. There was no wave of immigrants from Belarus, Ukraine or Russia, even though Ukrainians, for example, can get a Schengen visa from Poland free of charge."). 177 Id. 178 Id. sian Federation, most of them illegally. 180 Thus, Russian-EU economic integration will not cause a flood of Russian labor into the EU.
The aforementioned political, economic and legal concerns return us to the question of the relationships between the rule of law, democracy, the economic system, and human rights -questions to which we now focus our attention.
B. The EU-Russia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA)
The EU and the Russian Federation aim to create an open integrated market. Just as the EU created a single integrated market in order to generate prosperity and interdependence to obviate and avert war, so too do the EU and Russian Federation seek to create an integrated market. 181 This open and integrated market is to be attained via the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, which is the principal legal instrument governing EU-Russia relations. 182 The EU also uses PCAs to relate to several other former Soviet Republics. 183 The PCAs seek, via functionalist incrementalism, to create over time the same base found in the EU: a customs union featuring the free movement of goods and capital, the right to establish enterprises, and eventually to include the exchange of professional services and workers. 184 The EU-Russia PCA forms the basis of the four "common spaces" between the EU and the Russian Federation 185 resulting in an effective institutional framework functioning through the Permanentquires the "gradual approximation of legislation." 189 Legal harmonization is one means to the end of improving the rule of law in Russia. Legal harmonization increases legal certainty and reduces transaction costs as do the suppression of tariff barriers, quantitative restrictions, and legal provisions with similar effect.
Common Space on Freedom, Security and Justice
This common space essentially governs police cooperation. 190 certain peacekeeping missions in Africa pursuant to the common space of external security.
Common Space of Research and Education, Including Cultural Aspects
This common space seeks to foster intellectual exchanges and encourage scientific and technical innovation as a key contributor to economic growth. 194 From the Russian perspective, it involves developing the Skolkovo research and industrial park, which is considered the Russian Silicon Valley. 195 
C. The Northern Dimension
The Northern Dimension's objective is to promote environmentally sustainable development throughout the region. 196 It is a regional political framework established to govern the Baltic and Arctic regions. 197 Most notably, it focuses on environmental pollution and cleanup issues that particularly concern radioactive waste 198 resulting from the decommissioning of Soviet-era nuclear vessels, and related issues such as health and maritime transit. 199 The Northern Dimension's objective is to promote environmentally sustainable development throughout the region.
D. The Eastern Partnership
The EU frames its relations with the Ukraine, Moldova, and the Caucasian republics within its Eastern Partnership framework. 201 The Joint Declaration of the Prague Eastern Partnership Summit stated that "[t]he main goal of the Eastern Partnership is to create the necessary conditions to accelerate political association and further economic integration between the European Union and interested partner countries." 202 To attain this goal of open borders and economic integration to foster economic development and ultimately political stability, the respect of human rights, and the rule of law, "[t]he European Commission proposed a 'differentiated, progressive, and benchmarked approach' to the new neighbors which was specified in the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) Strategy paper." 203 To promote this strategy, the EU has jointly mobilized aid and trade as rewards for the attainment of the rule of law and human rights protections to EU standards. 204 cles that had been hindering improved economic integration, however, will be increasingly surmounted by visionary leadership in the EU, Russia, and the other former Soviet Republics. This is because of increased transnational institutional awareness and improved mutual understanding. Most importantly, it is also because of the mutual recognition that EU cooperation with the formation of EU-modeled transnational governance in the Russian Federation and the former Soviet Republics is complementary and not conflicting.
E. WTO Accession
The EU views Russia's accession to the WTO as a means of achieving the end of increased prosperity through freer trade, and the construction of legal institutions as the formation of a Russian rule of law state. 206 The United States shares this view. 207 For its part, the Russian Federation wishes to join the WTO 208 and coordinates its accession with EurAsEC 209 and the EU 210 toward that goal. This paper argues that free trade leads to specialization and economies of scale, and that the rule of law increases legal certainty and reduces transaction costs. This in turn leads to increased prosperity and the reduced likelihood of war. The EU and EurAsEc are aiming to achieve the same goals of greater prosperity and political security through free trade. Thus, the EU and EurAsEc are not in conflict, but rather compliment each other. 211 The WTO extends the logic of free trade as the path to peace and prosperity to the global level.
212 It is therefore desirable for the Russian Federation to join the WTO, since joining will both reflect and increase acceptance by the West of the Russian Federation's economic growth and future potential. Political issues appear to have needlessly hindered that economic process.
Following derailment of Russia's WTO accession process because of its 2008 war with Georgia, the Russian Federation is now back on track to conclude its accession to the WTO Treaty. 213 The EU and Russia appear to have worked out their differences 214 and are prepared to see the Russian Federation join the WTO. 215 Both the EU and the Russian Federation consider Russian participation in the WTO as desirable since it creates new economic opportunities on both sides of the ledger. 216 Russian adhesion to the WTO should not be impeded by Russia's existing free trade with areas such as EurAsEC. 217 The bottom line: Russia and the EU need each other, and the United States should foster that process as part of globalization because it will lead to greater stability and productivity for all.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper has argued that the Russian Federation and other former Soviet Republics can apply EU governance models in their relations with each other, and with the EU. To make that case, this paper compared the objectives and institutional structure of the USSR, the EU, and the CIS. The USSR and EU both tried to react to the problem of war to obtain the best standard of living possible for their people. Nevertheless, they pursued these objectives in radically different manners. Recognizing that both the USSR and EU shared common goals helps us to contextualize the USSR's collapse and the CIS' failure. It also enables us to propose workable governance models based on the EU's extensive historical experiences in transnational governance. Such institutions and rules can serve as a basis for the formation of the rule of law in Eastern Europe that, in turn, will generate economic prosperity, especially through trade liberalization. This will consequently improve the real protection of basic human rights in the region and make conflict less likely. Understanding the mutually reinforcing character of a market economy, the rule of law, and human rights protection enables all actors to pursue the best rules and processes to obtain optimal outcomes for all. Common teleologies, coupled with conflicting methods of competing governance models contextualize historical experiences: understanding these broad tendencies enables mutual understanding, and enables us to build bridges instead of walls.
